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In this paper, I discuss how a situated cognition perspective can reveal the socially 
constructed nature of seemingly psychological heuristics and errors in market actors’ 
judgements and decisions in financial markets. In doing so, I present a complementary 
approach to the heuristics and biases research in psychology and behavioural finance. More 
specifically, I draw on the narrative mode of knowing and explanation in real market settings 
as a framework to understand the content and the process of socially constructed knowledge 
in financial markets. Here, narratives of market actors and their underlying frames and causal 
schemas are assumed to function as a judgement heuristic in processing information flows. I 
then discuss an application of this approach to a sample of brokerage firms and investment 
advisers serving retail investors in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). My findings focus on a 
shared frame and the associated causal schema about the ISE and global financial markets. 
This interpretive model underpinned my interlocutors’ narrative judgements and forecasts 
about the ISE’s movements and constituted a form of representativeness heuristic and 
anchoring. 
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 In this paper, I discuss why the collection and analysis of market actors’ 
naturally occurring narratives in real market settings should be used as one of the approaches 
to studying cognitive heuristics and biases in financial markets. My argument for this 
approach comes from the combination of two positions in humanities and social sciences. The 
first is that cognition is a type of action that is situated, meaning that cognition takes place in 
constant interaction with social, cultural and material contexts (Wilson, 1993). Consequently, 
I argue that cognitive heuristics and biases are socially, culturally, and materially shaped 
rather than universally latent in human mind. The second is that in this interactive and 
context-bound cognitive action of human-beings, narration and generating causal explanations 
are the salient mode of knowing and explanation of observed and experienced situations, 
events and actions (Bruner, 1986; Polkinghorne, 1988; Lagnado, 2011). I therefore assume 
the prevalence of narrative mode and causal schematization in market actors’ situated 
cognition of market events and actions.  
 To substantiate these points and a narrative approach to studying situated 
cognition in financial markets, I make a brief conceptual and methodological meta-review of 
the extant psychological and behavioural explanations of judgement and decision heuristics 
and biases. I then observe a consequence of the ontological and epistemological positions 
historically taken in psychology and behavioural finance fields – namely,                                                                                                                                                                                                           
a lack of systematic study of social factors in human judgement and decision-making in non-
experimental contexts (DeBondt et al., 2008). This is followed by the introduction of situated 
cognition as a holistic alternative to understanding judgement and decision-making in 
financial markets. Here, I also discuss the salience of narrative mode of knowing and 
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explanation in situated cognition, and how collecting and studying market actors’ narratives 
can give researcher natural access to both the content and the processes of socially 
constructed market knowledge.  
 In the final section, I demonstrate an application of this approach to retail 
investors and their brokers in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE). In a field research conducted 
between 2008 and 2009, I found that narratives from a sociological sample of brokers serving 
retail investors in the ISE constituted a form of situated frame and associated causal schema. I 
demonstrate how this interpretive model acted as representativeness heuristic and anchor (à la 
Tversky and Kahneman 1974) in these brokers’ interpretations and predictions of price 
movements in the ISE. I also discuss the institutional origins and current dynamics of this 
interpretive model in the ISE, including econometric evidence on the model’s possible effect 
on the ISE’s co-movements with global markets. The paper concludes with recapping the 
conceptual and empirical points made about the usefulness of situated cognition and 
narratives in our behavioural understanding of market outcomes. 
2 Psychology, Behavioural Finance and Social Construction of Reality  
 Starting with the bounded rationality assumption of Herbert Simon (1955) based 
on several factors such as limited cognitive capacity of individuals, information availability, 
and the time and costs associated with optimizing decisions, the psychological explanations of 
individual cognition and decision making have undermined the expected utility and Bayesian 
updating framework of rational choice theory. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) studied the 
effects of uncertainty on human cognition. These concern situations where available 
information is insufficient to sensitize people to statistical and probabilistic properties of the 
given situation and to make judgements in accordance with the rational choice framework. 
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Tversky and Kahneman (1974) found out that under such circumstances, people resorted to 
short cuts or cognitive heuristics such as representativeness (formation of beliefs that violate 
probability and statistical rules), availability (of information and its salience), and adjustment 
and anchoring (in relation to arbitrary reference points). Kahneman and Tversky (1979) then 
looked at evidence on how, under full information on gains/losses and their probability, 
people acted in ways that violated several tenets of the expected utility theory. These tenets 
are the centrality of overall wealth in decisions, the determination of the utility of a prospect 
by aggregating the probability-based outcomes of that prospect, and risk aversion (Kahneman 
and Tversky, 1979, 263-4). To explain these violations, Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 271) 
theorized that individuals first reframed the given prospects into simpler terms of gains or 
losses in reference to a neutral point. Moreover, this framing could be partly affected by how 
the situation was formulated. People then evaluated the outcomes by generating and attaching 
them decision weights that ‘do not coincide with stated probabilities’ (274). Tversky and 
Kahneman (1981) referred to these processes as “decision frame” and argued that decision 
frame is partly controlled by ‘the norms, habits and personal characteristic of the decision 
maker’ (453).  
 These groundbreaking studies demonstrated that individuals while making 
decisions under informational certainties or otherwise do not necessarily think and make 
decisions in a probabilistic framework. After these, behavioural finance has emerged as a 
meaningful challenge to the rational actor-efficient market framework of modern finance 
theory  (Forbes, 2009). As authoritative reviews of the field have noted (Hirshleifer, 2001; 
Daniel et al., 2002; Barberis and Thaler, 2003;DeBondt et al., 2008), there are institutional 
and market-exchange based limits to arbitrage, which is put forward by modern finance as one 
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of the explanations why mispricing -if ever occurs- always disappears. As the cause of 
mispricing and  long-running aggregate abnormalities in asset returns not expected by modern 
finance theory, behavioural finance points to individual sources of decision-errors or biases 
such as cognitive heuristics, self-deception, and emotions, and to Kahneman and Tversky's 
theory on our preferences.  
 From a methodological perspective, one common feature among the reviewed 
studies in the above surveys is the way they use aggregate market data. This can be described 
as deductive because asset pricing models of modern finance theory are used to detect 
anomalies in aggregate market data. These anomalies are subsequently explained by what 
Barberis and Thaler (2003) call ‘stories’ about what might have actually happened. Naturally 
these stories are informed by the behavioural theories associated with beliefs and preferences 
discussed above. When it comes to the detection and explanation of behavioural patterns 
among different groups of investors such as females, college graduates. (Barberis and Thaler 
2003:1099), a similar deductive approach is used .  
 Partly because of this deductive approach and its limitations on our imaginations 
about financial markets, two of the surveys studied above (Hirshleifer 2001, DeBondt et al 
2008) and several studies to which they refer (e.g. Shiller 1984) call for a specific research 
agenda. This research agenda is complementary to deductive approaches to the state and 
effects of individual beliefs, psychology and preferences. It concerns the study of the effects 
of sociological factors on individual and market level outcomes. For instance, in Shiller 
(1984), Hirshleifer (2001), and Akerlof and Shiller (2009), we see a call for specific focus on 
how social dynamics or processes are involved in belief and preference formation,  diffusion 
and disappearance, and how these might affect market outcomes. In a theoretically broader 
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argument, DeBondt et al (2008) call for a conceptualization of reality and individual actors in 
the context of financial markets and societies as social constructions. As they put it, such a 
conceptualization means studying ‘the tangible content of people’s thought processes... [in] 
reference to social, cultural and historical factors’ that eventually shape these processes. In 
DeBondt et al’s (2008, 9-10) understanding, meanings people generate about ‘their motives, 
outlook, self-image’, and hence their actions are not merely individual-psychological and 
isolated. They happen in socio-cultural and historical contexts, which generate role structures 
and expectations from these roles. De Bondt et al (2008, 10) refer to the resultant collective 
beliefs and practices in financial markets and economy as ‘intuitive economic stories’ and 
‘economic arguments’. They argue that ‘the content, style and structure of these stories’ can 
explain why we see certain persistent patterns related to investment and consumption in 
different markets and economies. DeBondt et al (2008, 10) also note the importance of 
technology in increasing our cognitive capacity, and of institutions in generating predictability 
and reducing the cognitive load in our judgements and decisions.  
2. Situated Cognition, Social Construction Of Reality, and Narrative Knowledge 
 To shift our focus from deductively explaining  abnormalities in market 
outcomes by psychological theories built on experiments lacking social context (Pressman, 
2006), and to generate sociologically informed explanations of these abnormalities, we can 
draw on the concept of situated cognition. In broad terms, situated cognition conceptualizes 
knowing as task-oriented social action that happens in relational, cultural and material 
contexts (Brown et al, 1989; Wilson, 1993, 72, Barsalau 2008, Smith and Conrey, 2009). This 
perspective starts with the assumption that knowing happens via representations that are 
attempts at mentally and/or physically manipulating 'objects involved in a situation' to 
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understand their relationships with each other, and their consequent transformations (Seel, 
2001, 407). These representations, as espoused in standard cognitive theories (Barsalou, 1999, 
2008), may take stable forms such as cognitive schema that exhibits rule-like understanding 
of objects, actors, and situations endemic to a specific environment- namely, ‘content full’ 
schema, or universal forms based on ‘abstract’ reasoning that has no bearing in real life 
experiences of the person cognizing (Ohlsson 1993, 52).  
 The novelty of situated cognition is that knowing is seen as an action outcome in 
which schemas, whether 'content full' or 'abstract', interact with the context where cognition 
takes place. This interaction generates 'momentary outcomes’ of knowing in which 'attributes 
of a situation evoke and shape particular schemas and... schemas make particular attributes of 
the situation salient' (Elsbach et al 2005, 424). There is no hierarchical relationship in this 
model between schema and context. Instead a constructive relationship is assumed where 
'mind projects order onto the diversity of world phenomena', structuring it in a certain way, 
and it is constrained in this structuring 'through the external world' (Seel, 2001, 408). Another 
important aspect of situated cognition is understanding knowledge and knowing as distributed 
phenomena. This refers to not only the interactional underpinnings of knowing and 
knowledge among people, but also the role of instruments and tools, whether they are 
physical, theoretical or organisational, in our cognition (Smith and Corney 2009, Michel 
2007, 508). All in all, situated cognition implies a cognitive system that comprises 
individuals’ mental and physical capacities alongside other factors that generate momentary 
cognitive outcomes.  
 Understanding cognition in situated and constructive terms does not necessarily 
mean that cognition is ‘infinitely flexible and responsive to the situation’ (Smith and Corney 
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2009, 459), and that our knowledge of the world is arbitrary. Communicative, relational, 
organisational and socio-cultural contexts constrain our cognition in particular practices 
(Michel, 2007, 509). From a general perspective and coming back to DeBondt et al's (2008) 
argument about socially constructed reality, the roles and associated norms we internalize as 
role holders are one such aspect of situated cognition. As Berger and Luckmann (1966, 47) 
explain it, these roles are constituted of typifications of objects and situations, and action 
scripts in institutionalized realms of life such as family and financial markets. We are 
assumed to internalize these roles as social reality in the capacity of role holders and 
observers of others. Berger and Luckmann (1966, 55-6) use the concepts ‘semantic fields’ and 
‘classificatory schemas’ to refer to the total sum of these objectified and internalized 
typifications and action scripts. Language functions as the store and conveyor of social stock 
of knowledge that exists in a multiplicity of semantic fields and in a range from generalist and 
most shared to esoteric and endemic to communities of practice (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966). 
 Another aspect of situated cognition- namely, communication and interaction 
among members of a semantic field such as financial market, can explain how socially 
constructed knowledge in the form of typifications and action scripts endemic to certain roles 
are generated, objectified and internalized. For instance, Nonaka and Toyoma (2005) point to 
dialogue and practice among members of an organisation by which individual subjectivities or 
tacit knowledge are shared/ externalized, and then synthesized with others' externalized 
knowledge, to be internalized again. Nonaka and Toyoma (2005, 432) describe this as 'a 
social process of validating truth' and a way of 'expanding knowledge' within organisations 
and between organisations and market. As Holland and Doran (1998, 137) demonstrate in the 
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case of fund managers, this type of dialogue and practice process within and across financial 
institutions and stock market companies functioned alongside commonly used instruments 
and tools of observation, measurement and calculation in fund management field. This social 
process constituted for fund managers not only a knowledge base with its typifications and 
action scripts but also a cognitive skill by which they were able to generate and process 
information, and incorporate it in their continuous valuation of assets' economic worth. At a 
broader level, however finance professionals and investors in their social construction of 
knowledge about financial assets are also subject to dynamic conditions of broader semantic 
fields such as markets and economies, and to these fields’ socio-cultural aspects such as 
shared constructs, fads and fashions in knowledge and action (Holland and Johanson, 2003, 
479-482).  
 The literature cited above implies first that situated cognition for individual and 
organizational actors in financial markets happen in nested semantic fields - narrower fields 
existing separately such as fund management, retail investment and brokerage are 
institutionalized within broader fields of markets and economies. Second, situated cognition, 
by virtue of its distributed and interactive nature, generates shared knowledge and practices, 
which are continuously externalized, objectified and internalized again, resulting in 
reifications and modifications in the social stock of knowledge in nested semantic fields. 
Third, depending on one's situation or position in these fields, which includes their knowledge 
creating social capital and interactions, one has a command of the social stock of knowledge 
with different degrees and modes of awareness and internalization. That is to say, a fund 
manager or analyst would share with other fund managers and analysts a certain structured 
cognition and decision-making process and resultant intellectual capital (Holland and 
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Johanson, 2003, 466-7). This would differ from that of retail investors and their brokers, 
despite the possibility that both types of actors can be aware of each other’s knowledge by 
publicly and privately available sources, and market relationships (Holland, 2006, 308). Such 
an awareness or sharing of other's knowledge does not necessarily mean a naïve 
internalization or consensus about knowledge's truth-value across actors and fields. Instead, it 
implies cognitive resources for reflexivity and strategic action in a field (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, 192; Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, 10) 
 While situated cognition of market actors is shaped by the above mentioned 
communicative, relational, organisational and socio-cultural dynamics of social construction 
of knowledge, market actors’ narratives about their unfolding market experiences constitute 
both a tool and a store of knowledge in these nested semantic fields. Narratives of market 
actors help externalize, objectify and reify the historical and contingent features of a market as 
social facts. The implication of this conceptual understanding of narratives and social 
construction of knowledge for judgement and decision-making under uncertainty is two-fold.  
 On the one hand, the observed tendency of people to violate certain tenets of 
probability theory and statistical rules (see Glovic et al 2002 for a comprehensive review of 
theory and evidence) or what Tversky and Kahneman (2002) refer to as 'intuitive' or 
'naturalistic' thinking, might stem from internalizing a certain semantic field. This mode of 
thinking, which is characterized by causal associations between situation at hand and the 
relevant social stock of knowledge, generates more coherent explanations within a given 
semantic field compared to a purely probabilistic mode (Tversky and Kahneman, 2002, 
Sloman, 2002). The strength of this mode of thinking can be seen in the fact that even 
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information availability does not always guarantee a shift to probabilistic thinking (Kahneman 
and Fredrick 2002).  
 On the other hand, by collecting and analysing narratives of market actors, we 
can gain access to market actors' semantic field, and explore how they ordinarily reason about 
unfolding market events and situations, actions of actors and their motivations. Although 
narrative as a form of discourse is not the only mode by which we generate written and oral 
discourse, other forms include argument, exposition, and description among others (Smith 
2003), putting our experiences into narrative form is seen by cognitive psychologists as the 
most salient and naturally occurring mode of knowing and explanation for human beings 
(Herman, 2003; Polkinghorne, 1988; Bruner, 1986). The narrative mode simply refers to 
making sense of our experiences by putting actions and events in temporal and causal order. 
This means that narratives generate meaning by going beyond a mere chronology of events 
and actions, and by plotting them together in a way that reveals how these are perceived to be 
causally contributing to the outcome under explanation (Legnado, 2011). They therefore have 
the potential to reveal those causal schemas market actors generate, reenact, and modify “on 
the fly” in their judgements and decision-making in financial markets. Here, on the fly or in 
situ oral and written reactions of market actors to events and situations can exhibit features of 
an argument or description, yet they would have the hallmark of narrative thinking-namely, 
the combination of causal thinking with unfolding experience in time. In financial markets, 
the resultant narratives can be seen as amounting to ‘microstructural models’ or ‘heuristics’ 
that explain and predict the unfolding state of markets (Rebonato, no date, 6).  
 To recap the arguments made about situated cognition, social construction of 
reality, and narrative knowledge, we can argue that judgement and decision-making in 
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financial markets are shaped by a number of relational, material, institutional and socio-
cultural factors. These factors constitute the context where situated cognition takes place, and 
underpin the social stock of knowledge that narrows down the outcomes in individual's on the 
fly cognition. Nevertheless, situated cognition implies neither infinite flexibility nor fully 
rigid cognitive processing and outcomes. Instead, it implies a socially shaped cognitive 
resource base by which individual actors ordinarily cope with the uncertainty and 
indeterminacy of ‘particular interactive situations' (Tsoukas, 1996, 15-18).  
 This type of processual and interactive understanding of cognition also applies 
to narrative thinking. The narrative mode, which is generally contrasted with the logico-
scientific mode- i.e. deducing explanations for events and actions from logic, universal truths, 
and scientific theories such as probability, does not necessarily mean that meanings are 
generated arbitrarily in narratives. Not only do narratives draw on the logico-scientific mode 
(Polkinghorne, 1988), but they are also subjected to audience effect and intertextuality (Boje 
,2001). Audience effect means that narratives are relational- they are told for specific 
purposes for specific audiences, which underpins their content, mode of delivery, and plots 
(Tilly, 2006). Intertextuality on the other hand refers to cross-references to other narratives 
that recount past experience, which means that narratives thrive on on-going experiences and 
past stories (Boje, 2001). These two factors are intimately associated with the typifications or 
framing of actors, actions, and situations that are central to the social construction of reality 
and knowledge in a given semantic field (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). Narratives therefore 
thrive on and modify these typifications, and reflect the historically sedimented, continuously 
reified and modified knowledge endemic to a semantic field (Czarniawska 2008, 36).  
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2.1.  Studying Situated Cognition In Financial Markets: Observation and Narrative 
Analysis 
 Sustained close-up observation of market actors in their natural settings, i.e. 
financial organisations and trading floors has advantage over standard interviews in studying 
cognition and decision-making in financial markets (Preda, 2007, 520). This is because 
observation allows access to naturally occurring descriptive data on the semantic field and the 
situated cognition setting in which financial market actors operate. This type of in-depth 
descriptive data can be obtained by recording market actors' actions and interactions, and the 
resulting cognitive outputs such as their oral and written discourses. These observations 
should ideally last until the collected descriptive and discourse data reaches saturation- 
namely, new inputs into the data become repetitive from both process and content 
perspectives (Atkinson and Hammersely, 2007). Triangulation of observations with another 
method such as interviews with observed actors helps reach data saturation and judge the 
validity of observation-based findings (Denzin, 2006, 471) Triangulation also allows 
researcher to generate a holistic account of the meaning and significance of observation-based 
findings from his/her interlocutors' perspective-'emic' explanations, which researcher can later 
turn into interpretive or 'etic' accounts by using social-scientific theories and concepts 
(Fetterman,2008:289). 
 While observations and interviews can give a richer description of the situated 
cognition in financial organisations,, analysis of in situ narratives, would specifically help 
researcher identify the generation and reification tools of the social stock of knowledge in 
these organisations and explore how these tools might be functioning as judgement and 
decision-making heuristics in the given field. As described by Czarniawska (2008) in the 
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context of narrative research in organisations, these tools are frames (typifications), and 
causal templates (action scripts). The analysis of plot structures, i.e. the specific order of 
sequencing in narratives, reveals causal templates and associated action scripts, whereas the 
analysis of narrative elements,i.e. events and actors that are attributed causality and 
intentionality, respectively, reveals frames or typifications on these elements (Czarniawska 
2008, 35-7).  
 Once frames and causal templates are identified in the narrative data, researcher 
can then explore various themes. One of these is how these cognitive schemas correspond to 
heuristics and biases identified in behavioural finance, and how they might be associated 
with specific decisions and aggregate outcomes in a given field or a market. Another is more 
sociological and concerns how these cognitive schemas are associated with the institutional 
evolution and dynamics of semantic fields of a market. In the following sections, I discuss 
the findings from such a research I conducted on the social dynamics of cognition and 
decision-making in retail investing and brokerage field in the Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) 
between 2008 and 2009. Although the research was conducted in the above-described 
methodological framework, below I discuss in more detail the data collection and analysis 
methods employed during the research.  
 3. Stories from the Istanbul Stock Exchange  
 Although, the ISE is an instrumental case (Stake, 1994:237) to study social 
dynamics of cognition and decision-making in an equity market, there are certain features of 
the ISE that reveal the historically evolving situated cognition contexts for its retail investors 
and brokers. The ISE, which is the only organized equity market in Turkey was opened in 
1986. In 1989, foreign investors were allowed to invest in the ISE. In 1995, the ISE became a 
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fully automated equity market. With the full automation, more and more brokerage firms 
combined their telephone dealing platforms with online platforms for retail and institutional 
investors. However it was in late 2001 when the ISE established a remote access system by 
which dealers and investors alike could send direct orders via brokerage firms’ online trading 
platforms. This undermined the importance of the ISE's trading floor and the floor brokers, 
and made brokerage firm headquarters the central nodes of investment advice and trading 
flow in the ISE. Since the ISE's opening, the equity market has been a multiple price-
continuous auction market where investors' orders are matched in price and time priority.   
 There are four types of investors in the ISE based on domicile and legal status. 
These are Turkish retail, Turkish institutional, foreign retail and foreign institutional 
investors. In the first decade of the ISE, probably owing to the manual mode of trading and 
data collection, the publicly available information on these investor types had not been as 
detailed and easily accessed as they have been in the post-automation of 2001. Since its 
foundation in 2001, the Association of Capital Market Intermediary Institutions of Turkey 
(ACMIT) has been publishing annual reports on these investors' equity market activities 
among other topics. These analyses stretch back to 1999. On the other hand, some local data 
vendors and secondary resources (Yildirim, 1995, 1996) provide patchy figures on some of 
these investor types' trading and investment preferences. These stretch back to the beginning 
of the 1990s. Together, these sources point to several interesting numerical figures about the 
average Turkish retail investor in historical perspective. These are: he/she has been a short-
term investor with average portfolio holding periods of several weeks. He/she has provided 
the bulk of liquidity in the ISE by consistently generating more than half of the annual trading 
volume over the years. Concomitantly, his/her share in the total market value of the shares 
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traded in the ISE have been decimated over the years and taken over by institutional investors, 
most being  foreign institutional investors. On a related note, according to the World Bank 
figures on stock market turnover rates, i.e. the ratio between total trading volume and total 
market capitalization, indicating how often shares change hands, the ISE has been historically 
a high turnover market compared to the relevant regional and country turnover figures (WB, 
2012)..  
 According to the ACMIT figures for 2009, almost a third of the approximately 
one million Turkish retail investors in the ISE reside in Istanbul, and they own two-thirds of 
the market value of shares owned by the Turkish retail investors. Perhaps not incidentally, 
almost all the 89 brokerage firms active in the ISE by the time of my research were head-
quartered in Istanbul, and most active retail clients, who traded frequently and generated a 
significant commission revenue were served by investment advisers in these headquarters.i   
 This brief history and the numerical figures demonstrate some significant 
features and outcomes of the Turkish retail investing and brokerage field. Having discovered 
these during the preliminary field research at ISE headquarters in the summer of 2007, I then 
decided to shift my investigation focus to brokerage firm headquarters in Istanbul. My field 
research in the headquarters of three Istanbul-based brokerage firms between 2008 and 2009 
has elucidated some of the situated cognitive and historical-institutional processes behind the 
semantic field of retail investing and brokerage in the ISE. 
 3.1. Methods 
. I secured access to the headquarters of three brokerage firms (Firm A in 
February 2008, Firm B in April 2008, Firm D in May 2009) where investment advisers, who 
worked for the retail sales departments of these firms, served relatively high wealth and/or 
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high frequency trading retail clients of each firm. These three brokerage firms had around 
50,000 Turkish retail clients all around Turkey. However the investment advisers I directly 
observed in four different trading floors (two from Firm A) served in total around 1,000 
clients who constituted the very core of these firms’ client portfolio and retail brokerage 
revenues. These clients mostly invested in the ISE equities but a small minority of them 
(almost all from Firm A) traded frequently in the ISE futures contracts too. In total, the retail 
sales departments of all three firms generated around 4.5 per cent of the annual trading 
volume in the ISE in 2008 and 2009.  
 In my selection of the observation sites, I used a method called sociological 
sampling in field research (Gold 1997). This method of case selection refers to finding a 
number of sites and informants who have potential to exhibit and reflect on various emergent 
themes related to the phenomenon investigated. Considering the difficulties of securing access 
for observation-based research in financial markets (MacKenzie, 2011), a sociological 
sampling, despite not meaning statistical representativeness for findings, still provides 
advantages over observation in a single site. Multi-site investigations increase the external 
validity or transferability of observation-based findings when other similar sites of social 
action are considered (Bryman, 2008:33). In this respect, all three sites represent variations 
and commonalities in the ISE's retail investing and brokerage field, which I discovered by 
triangulation (Denzin, 2006). More specifically, I interviewed ten senior market professionals 
from nine leading brokerage firms that contributed significantly to the ISE's annual trading 
volume, four managers and one expert from the ISE overseeing the equity market trading, the 
general manager of the ACMIT and its head of research, and four Turkish retail investors who 
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have significant weight in parts or the whole of daily trading activity in the ISE. The list of 
interviewees is provided in the appendix.  
 I stayed in each firm around two weeks to do direct observations and conduct 
interviews. The dates of each site research and the duration of direct observations are 
provided in the findings section. It should be noted here that some of the days at each site 
were used for triangulation discussions and interviews. To record the naturally occurring 
conversations among the trading room staff, I used a notebook and sometimes a voice 
recorder wherever it was permitted. I was not allowed to access telephone conversations 
between investment advisers and clients on anonymity and technical difficulty grounds but I 
overheard a few conversations as such when a speaker phone was used. Because trading 
floors were relatively small and populated by five to ten investment advisers, it was easier for 
me to follow most of the verbal utterances and note these down contemporaneously without 
having to rely on a voice recorder. However it should be stated here that my field notes do not 
contain all the things that had been said in the trading room such as the routine football banter 
on Mondays! I focussed on those conversations and solo reactions about market events and 
actions. To triangulate the observation based findings, I held informal discussions with my 
interlocutors and formal interviews with the following staff overseeing each firm's retail 
brokerage operations:  floor manager, operations manager, branches manager, and general 
manager. These interviews took place during each field site research and are not listed in the 
appendix.  
 The observation data were analysed to identify in situ narratives within for the 
aforementioned purpose of identifying frames and causal templates and demonstrating how 
they generated and reified the social stock of knowledge in these organisations. The 
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identification was made according to an operationalized definition of sensemaking narratives 
drawn from organisational narrative research   (Gabriel, 2000; Boje, 2001,): Sensemaking 
narratives are discourses beyond a sentence by which narrator connects two or more clauses 
together for retrospective and/or prospective explanation.  
 To distinguish among the recurring plot structures in the collected narratives, I 
introduced four plot logics that draw on Boje’s (2001:101) causality or stream analysis in 
narratives and reflect the spectrum of reasoning I encountered in the field data. These are 
“cause-effect”, “correlation”, “randomness”, and “proto-story”. As discussed before, 
establishing cause-effect relationship between events and actions within a temporal frame and 
based on an observed/predicted outcome is foundational to narrative reasoning (Polkinghorne, 
1988:21). Correlation logic in my interlocutors’ narratives emerged in the form of perceiving 
correlation relationships among stock market indexes, generally across equity and futures 
markets abroad and in Turkey, when there were no news events to explain market 
movements. Randomness logic is about interpretive moments when my interlocutors failed to 
make sense of the events and actions they observed on the screens in a meaningful manner 
and made their puzzlement clear in their narratives. Proto-story, an organisational narrative 
concept borrowed from Gabriel (2000), refers to narratives in which my interlocutors’ 
explanations fell short of invoking one of the logics and simply sequenced selected events and 
actions without connecting them meaningfully with a direct explanation or prediction. Within 
the data, I also encountered narratives in which a past market outcome was invoked, generally 
in full, to point to the similarity between that past outcome and the current situation. The 
explicit reasoning in similarity logic was that because of the similarity, the current situation 
should resolve like the way the past situation did.  
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 The other significant part of my analysis was narrative element analysis, i.e. 
classifying actors and phenomena that frequently featured in the narrative data. Here the aim 
was to link the plot logics with local and international actors and phenomena in order to 
discover how my interlocutors framed these 'actants'- human and non-human entities that are 
capable of acting and being acted on (Czarniawska, 2004, 80)-in relation to causal templates. 
   
 4. Findings 
The table below present the total number of narratives identified in each of the four trading 
rooms directly observed. These narratives are classified according to a number of  categories 
significance of which is discussed later in the paper. . 
Table 1 here 
 4.1. The Influence of Technology and Organisational  Division of Labour on 
Situated Cognition in Trading Rooms 
Before discussing the findings, it is important to describe the technological and organisational 
circumstances in which the observed investment advisers narrated the market events and 
actions because these circumstances influenced the situated cognition of investment advisers. 
Their description can thus help readers contextualize the findings discussed below. 
Investment advisers relied on a computer and multiple screens to follow the news and data 
flows on the ISE and other markets. These computers were powered by standardized software 
provided by local data vendors for data transmission, presentation and analysis, and for order 
logging and execution. Investment advisers used telephones (with headsets) to communicate 
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with their clients. As discussed in detail in Cetina and Preda (2007), the technology that the 
investment advisers used in the ISE was an example of a scopic market system.  
 Scopic here refers to both suffix “scope” that is used to describe observation 
devices such as telescope, and scope's other meaning, i.e. to look at or examine carefully 
(Dictionary.com). The contemporary mode of representation and observation in financial 
markets is scopic. Computer screens and the interconnected systems of data collection, 
processing and transmission constitute the market device by which market actors carefully 
examine  unfolding events and actions with ‘intensity and preparedness’, and participate in 
market activity (Cetina and Preda, 2007,132). As discussed by Cetina and Preda (2007), the 
most important components of the scopic market systems-namely,  the presentation of 
individual data streams (price, trading volume, news, etc.), order matching, and conversation 
channels for traderswork in a sequential flow mode, i.e. piece by piece and 
processed/disseminated at particular moments in time. Owing to the contemporaneous 
representation of multiple data streams, Cetina and Preda (2007, 132) describe market actors' 
observation and cognitive mode before the screens as a mode of moving around individual 
streams, and following and anticipating the flows within, which are ‘grounded more in a 
structure of feeling rather than in modes of calculation’. 
 These conceptual descriptions pretty much captured what the investment 
advisers whom I observed in all the four sites were doing before their computer screens. It 
was observed that the investment advisers gave their constant attention to their screens with 
eye movements and sometimes slight tilts of head, to be able to focus on a specific part of the 
screen. They also used their computer mouse and keyboard to log in client orders, retrieve 
more in-depth and/or historical data, and run analysis functions such as charts. As an external 
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calculation tool, many used a table calculator to do rudimentary calculations. Many more 
complex calculations such as those on client accounts, quoted companies, and markets were 
generated by the software on their computer. In all the trading rooms, with the exception of 
Firm A's branch, there was also the presence of one or more analysts on quoted companies 
and the Turkish economy, either in person or via telephone or email. This technological and 
analyst assistance or distributed cognition freed up investment advisers’ time.   
 Investment advisers therefore frequently conversed with their clients, especially 
with those whom traded on a daily basis. Similar to what Cetina and Preda (2007) described 
about the mode of observation and cognition before scopic screens, during these 
conversations, investment advisers explained what had been going on in the markets and what 
to expect in the coming minutes, hours and days. Investment advisers also conversed among 
themselves and with their analysts. These generally started after a reaction by an investment 
adviser or an analyst to something happening on the screen. Occasionally, their loud reactions 
to screen events were not followed up by their colleagues. The narratives captured during my 
observations came from these collective and individual sensemaking efforts to understand the 
connections between events and actions observed on their computer screens and predict their 
future course.  
 4.2. A common framing and causal schema in all observation sites  
 As discussed before, the observations were made between February and April 
2008, and in May 2009 in four different sites. After carefully analysing the observation data, 
narratives were identified according to the operationalized definition. What are the major 
findings from this analysis? To begin with, in all the four sites, the investment advisers 
framed the ISE as an emerging market that should move in tandem with the indices in more 
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developed markets of the world such as the Deutsche Aktirien Index (DAX) in Germany, the 
Dow Jones Industrial (DJI) in the USA. Thanks to the geographical location of Istanbul, these 
indexes overlapped with the ISE in trading hours to varying degrees. The biggest overlap 
happened between the ISE and the DAX.  
 To give an example of a narrative that invoked this frame and the associated 
causal schema, on my very first day of observation in the field (19 February 2008) at Firm A 
headquarters, I witnessed and recorded the following conversation while I was sitting between 
the strategist Ahmet and an investment adviser, Mehmet, and directly overseeing another 
investment adviser, Hakan, and his screen (all names henceforth are pseudonyms). In the 
room, there were three more investment advisers and two analysts. Each investment adviser 
served around 15 high frequency and/or high net worth Turkish retail investors: 
Hakan: What is the deal behind Germany [the DAX spot and futures indexes]? 
Ahmet has a glance at his double screen : It is profit realization! 
Mehmet in a tongue in cheek manner: Does everything have to happen for a reason? 
Hakan:Then the guy [his client] is asking on the phone and I have nothing to say! 
 
 This conversation attests to the several points made before, and intimates some 
other regularities about the situated cognition of market professionals in scopic market 
systems like the ISE. To begin with, we see a very short narrative here that explains “the deal 
behind Germany” by attributing the motive of realizing profit to anonymous investors in the 
German stock market. One event directly observed (falling index value) on the screen is 
plotted with an intentional action that is assumed to be happening, and observed via falling 
index values. The narrative is about the past and present, making a causal explanation. It does 
not make any prediction. Hakan, after getting the response, does not react to the explanation 
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along the lines of “what profit?” or “whose profit?” Here, all the narrators share an ongoing 
market experience or the intertextuality of narratives (Kristeva, 1980) which allows them to 
link the repeated past situations with the present. Also, there is the unspoken reason or shared 
causal schema as to why investment advisers in Istanbul, whose clients do not invest in the 
DAX, have to worry about the German stock market.    
 One might object to my interpretation here on the intertextuality because of 
Mehmet’s reaction to this narrative, which seems to undermine the explanation itself and the 
whole notion of making sense of the markets in this way, especially when there is no news 
event or new information to update one's expectations. However, as the day unfolded, 
Mehmet generated stories similar to “the profit realization” story, explaining what was 
happening in market indices abroad and more importantly connecting them to market 
movements in Istanbul, invoking the correlation logic. Mehmet did so whilst he was 
conversing with others in the room and his handful of high frequency trading clients on the 
telephone. Mehmet’s initial reaction to Hakan was more about the usual banter in the trading 
room, which I was to witness time and again. On the other hand, Hakan, with his response to 
Mehmet, made very explicit what their role as investment advisers in the retail brokerage field 
necessitated, especially in the communicative context they shared with their clients. As 
investment advisers looking after high frequency trading Turkish retail clients, they had the 
role of generating and communicating timely interpretations of price and index movements, 
and  keeping a sort of constant cognitive tab on the pulse of  markets for their clients. Here, as 
in other communicative contexts under uncertainty, the maxim of information/interpretation 
value trumped over the maxim of truth or the quality of that particular 
information/interpretation (Grice, 1975 cited in Tversky and Kahneman, 2002, 45-6).  
25 
 
 From an organisational perspective, Firm A, like other brokerage firms serving 
Turkish retail investors, generated most of their income from retail investor activity (see 
endnote I). This meant that investment advisers were tasked by brokerage firm managers with 
striking a balance between persuading their clients to trade frequently and keeping their 
clients’ portfolios under sustainable risk. As mentioned before, certain monitoring tools 
helped advisers in this role. Nevertheless, the interpretive aspect of this role – namely, 
continuously making sense of the markets and predicting their future course with trading 
advice tailored for clients’ preferences rested with investment advisers. 
 The frame that placed the ISE as an integral part of a network of stock markets 
around the world was a shared interpretive tool among the investment advisers in the 
headquarters trading room of Firm A.It also underpinned many narrative interpretations of the 
unfolding market events and actions. I was in Firm A headquarters between 19 February and 
5 March 2008 and my observations lasted eight and a half days. Over the course of my 
observation in Firm A headquarters, out of the 293 narratives collected, 54 per cent of these 
narratives invoked this frame directly or indirectly within all the plot logics discussed before. 
From an interpretive perspective, some of these narratives, like the first narrative example 
above implied that events and actions from abroad were relevant to the ISE without making 
this explicit. Some others on the other hand mentioned the ISE directly at the receiving end of 
a news or market event abroad, generally from the USA, and Germany, and to a lesser extent 
from powerful emerging markets such as Russia and Brazil. They then explained and/or 
predicted the ISE-related event/action accordingly, implying a causal or correlation 
relationship, and sometimes sanctioning a trading move accordingly. 
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 The following occurred on 25 February 2008 at 15:30 pm right before the 
January 2008 US new home sales data was released (all times henceforth are GMT+2). The 
expectation survey result was – 4 per cent and available from Reuters and Bloomberg screens 
in the trading room. The expectation was announced to all investment advisers and their 
clients beforehand by email and verbal reminders. All the investment advisers were ready for 
the data release; some investment advisers prepared orders to be sent to the ISE futures once 
they heard whether the data was good or bad in relation to the expectation survey. Then the 
research assistant Hande, who was responsible for simultaneously announcing and 
interpreting the data shouted: ‘-5.3 very bad data’. Another investment adviser, Onur, next to 
whom I was sitting on that day shouted: ‘Awful data’.I then observed that a few orders were 
sent in this 30 second period, mostly sell orders and some corrections in the order amounts. 
Then, Onur explained to one of his clients on the line what happened: ‘When the [US new 
home sales] data came, it [the ISE futures] made 200-300 point down, now it gives reaction 
from that  point' He then repeated the explanation to another client on the line. 
 In Firm A’s branch, I observed an investment adviser and three Turkish retail 
investors for a total of three and a half days between 6 and 13 March 2008. From the 
narratives told in this room and from my discussions with the residents of the room, it became 
apparent that they were rather critical of the frame as a trading strategy but internalized it 
strategically as a means to make sense of and predict the ISE's daily movements. One of the 
investors in the room said the following, when I asked him what he thought of the frame 
being invoked frequently in the headquarters trading room: ‘They [investment advisers] are 
like parrots you know, “the DAX is up, the DAX took off”, it means nothing, we look at the 
fundamentals [of company performance] here' (Informal discussion 5 March 2009). Indeed 
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these three investors and their investment adviser were much more interested in news and data 
flows about those ISE shares on their radar than what happened abroad. Nevertheless, most of 
those shares belonged to a group of around 200 shares that were not very liquid nor covered 
by securities analysts in Istanbul and in other important financial hubs such as London. This 
lack of securities analyst coverage in this group of shares contrasted with the intense coverage 
by securities analysts of around 100 shares, such as banks, industrial and service companies, 
which also constituted the ISE's major indices. Moreover, the latter group of major index 
shares were also more exposed to the effects of the frame owing to the frame induced daily 
trading by Turkish retail investors in these liquid shares. As a result, the residents of the 
branch invoked the frame to explain the ISE’s index movements. The frame was thus not 
turned into a meaningful trading strategy owing to the branch residents’ preferences to invest 
in that particular type of 'uncovered' ISE shares discussed above. Consequently, in this 
branch, the frame was invoked in 23 per cent of the 93 narratives collected.  
 To give an example, the following conversations started around 15:30 pm (when 
the US markets opened) on 10 March 2008 between the investment adviser Furkan and Arda, 
one of the three retail investors in the room and a novice retail investor compared to the rest. 
In all the instances of narratives in which there was no news event, the narrators invoked the 
correlation logic. When there was news, it was the cause-effect logic that was invoked. All the 
narratives are about the past and present, yet the last sentence conveys a generalization about 
Turkish retail investor behaviour that can help Arda the novice investor predict the future: 
Arda: They are selling IsBank [national-bank quoted in the ISE] heavily, why? 
Furkan: It is because they [investors] are selling abroad! 
Around 20 minutes later: 
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Arda: They [investors in the ISE] are selling again everywhere [in major ISE shares],why, the 
DAX is good! 
Furkan: Because there are sells in the USA; they [investors in the ISE] get panicky very quick 
15 minutes later (five minutes after the better than expected US consumer goods sales data 
were announced at 16:00 pm) 
Arda: Eee what, now they [investors in the ISE] are buying! 
Furkan: I’ve told you, they [investors in the ISE] do [according to] whatever happens in the 
USA and in the DAX! 
  
 In Firm B and Firm D, the frame was almost equally ubiquitous with 48.5 per 
cent of the 128 narratives captured in Firm B, and 42 per cent of the 82 narratives in Firm D. I 
was in in Firm B headquarters between 8 and 17 April and my direct observations lasted 
seven days. In Firm B headquarters there were ten investment advisers, each looking after 
around 60 high net-worth and/or medium frequency trading investors. I made my observations 
in Firm D headquarters a year later between .4 and 13 May 2009. My direct observations 
there lasted five days. In Firm D's headquarters there were 5 investment advisers each serving 
around 40 high net worth and/or high frequency trading clients.  
 In both sites, there were the presence, via regular email updates and telephone 
connection, of strong research teams composed of macro economy and sector analysts. The 
research teams in each site, like their counterparts in other firms serving institutional 
investors, covered around 100 quoted ISE companies that constituted a large part of the ISE 
30 and ISE 100 indices. Unlike Firm A’s smaller research team that was composed of two 
analysts and one strategist to serve Turkish retail clients, these larger research teams in firms 
B and D were formed exclusively to serve, alongside their institutional sales colleagues,  
institutional clients from Europe, Turkey, and the USA.  
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 However, the investment calls of the research departments in firms B and D 
were generally translated by the trading strategist of each retail sales department. This meant 
that the strategists would combine these professional and generally longer-term investment 
calls with chart analysis and news flows to make them more suitable for the short-term 
investment preference of their Turkish retail clients. Here, the frame and the associated causal 
schema also played a role in these translations as expectations about news and market events 
abroad were incorporated in these short-term share specific calls.  
 In this vein, sometimes the frame overrode chart-based share-specific dynamics 
pointed by the strategists. The following narrative-cum-trading advice was given by Berna, 
one of the ten investment advisers in Firm B headquarters, on 8 April 2008 to one of her 
clients. I noted down Berna's reaction only but asked her later to explain me what the client 
asked. The client, who had made a profit on a recently opened position in a holding company 
share (covered by the in-house analyst), wanted to increase his position after he received a 
chart note from the strategist about an upside potential in the share. Berna reacted as below, 
which can be seen as a narrative predicting the future, and convinced her client to close the 
position: 
You should not increase your position. Instead, realize your profit and start over with another 
position. It is because the DOW will probably open negative today, and then  your profit or 
worse an increased position in Koc [name of the holding company] will take a hit. 
 
 The frame rarely failed to explain the figures on scopic screens. In such rare 
circumstances, investment advisers resorted to the logic of randomness in their narratives (11 
instances) and exuded a sense of confusion. As an example, the following narrative was told 
by Erhan, an investment adviser in Firm B's headquarters, to one of his clients on the phone (9 
April 2008):  
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We can't make sense of it really, we look at abroad, they are all in minus, but we [the ISE] is 
up in positive... I can't really say anything [as to why it is like this] here [in the ISE] really... 
 
 More than a year after my observation in Firm B and the above stories by Berna 
and Erhan, the strategist and five investment advisers in Firm D' headquarters were also 
observed to have frequently made sense of the ISE events by looking afar at the US and other 
developed country markets (42 per cent of the 82 narratives collected in Firm D). As an 
example of this shared and continuous cognitive stance, I provide a proto-story example from 
Firm D which invoked the frame but did not make a direct correlation explanation about the 
state of the ISE from the frame. In all the sites, there were 265 proto-stories told and 91 of 
them invoked the frame in a similar way to one below:  
Helin the investment adviser: Ismail, the indices abroad are all negative, what is happening? 
Ismail the strategist: There is actually no news from abroad...  
Melda the investment adviser: And the market [the ISE] has now come back [verbalizing the 
ISE index turning negative too, but not explicitly linking it to the negative indices abroad with 
a correlation logic]. 
 
 Attesting to the ubiquity of the frame in the narrative dataset, in all the sites, out 
of the 265 cause-effect stories, 129 invoked the frame in addition to the 91 proto-story, 44 
correlation, 11 randomness, and one similarity plot-logic narratives, taking the narrative 
outcomes of the frame to a total of 276 narratives (46 per cent ). On the other hand, the 
different modes of internalizing the frame discussed above also explain some other noticeable 
variations presented in Table 1. Cetina and Preda (2007,116) argue that scopic market systems 
undermine social network-based or private information search in markets. As can be seen in 
the table, in all the trading rooms except Firm A branch, such private information was hardly 
used in making sense of market movements and resulting narratives- the highest usage is 4 per 
cent from Firm B and the lowest is 1.2 per cent from Firm D. Instead, it was predominantly 
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the market data flows (517 out of 598), especially those from abroad that helped the 
investment advisers make sense of the market outcomes. In Firm A branch on the other hand, 
owing to their share preferences, residents continued to rely significantly on private 
information from social networks in their sensemaking efforts and consequent narratives (20 
per cent). I discuss the significance of Table 1 figures on the narrative's temporal orientation 
later in the paper.  
 4.3. The frame’s endurance and origins  
As discussed above, there were similarities and differences in organisational positions and 
strengths of each brokerage firm. Despite the differences, the frame and the associated causal 
schema, which positioned the ISE as part of a global system of financial markets, were shared 
in all the four sites. This was irrespective of whether one internalized this frame strategically 
or objectively. The frame was also an enduring one. More than one year after finishing my 
observations in Firm B, I started my observation in Firm D and immediately recognized the 
frame and the associated causal schema in action in investment advisers’ conversations and 
narratives. Although the global market conditions were different in April 2008 (the eve of a 
global economic and financial meltdown) and May 2009 (offshoots of recovery in the 
collapsed global financial and economic system), the ISE was still at the receiving end of any 
economic and financial event abroad.  
 As part of my field research, I also made observations in two institutional sales 
departments, one in a fourth firm in July-August 2008, and one in Firm D in May-June 2009, 
and in an asset management company in April 2008. In these sites, the frame was also 
invoked, although in appreciably lesser frequencies, and mostly during executing client orders 
(institutional sales) and portfolio adjustments (asset management company). My observations 
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and discussions with my interlocutors in these sites demonstrated that the frame was 
strategically internalized to cope with the ISE’s daily trading dynamics originating from the 
Turkish retail investors' consistent reactions to markets abroad. As one fund manager put it 
'These co-movements between the US [markets] and the ISE happen because of the domestics' 
[Turkish retail investor] psychology' (Informal discussion, 18 April 2008). Another fund 
manager intimated his feeling of overreaction when I asked about the frame: 'When they fart 
there [in the US markets], we soil ourselves here [in the ISE]’ (Informal discussion, 18 April 
2008). As can be inferred from these reactions, the frame was hardly invoked as an 
investment strategy to be used or shared with institutional clients in these institutional 
investment sites. As mentioned before, the investment strategies in these sites were 
predominantly informed by security analysts’ valuations of the ISE companies, and by macro 
economy strategists’ econometric forecasts on the Turkish economy.  
 Despite these differences in the way frame was internalized, i.e. strategically 
versus objectively, for an outside observer like me who spent around 11 months in Istanbul in 
2008 and 2009 and followed the ISE very closely in that time period, it was not easy to ignore 
the ubiquity of this frame and the associated causal schema in written and oral commentary on 
digital data platforms, brokerage firm websites, financial news portals, business TV channels, 
and so on. During my interviews with employees of other brokerage firms and with notable 
Turkish retail investors, this frame and the associated causal schema were also acknowledged 
as an important explanatory factor for the ISE’s movements. Some of my interlocutors even 
joked about the ubiquity of the frame in pointing to its internalization among the members of 
general public who were interested in the ISE. A regional retail sales manager in a leading 
brokerage firm made the following remark (Interview, 1 September 2008): 
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10 years ago, the market would rally with [rumours about] what leading local investors were 
doing, now the shopkeeper in Afyon [a small Anatolian city] asks about the future of Tom 
[DOW] Jones [we both laugh and he adds this really happened], then you hear in a village in 
Kars [an Eastern province bordering Iran and Armenia] ‘What will the FED do?’ [this was a 
joke]. Now people [retail investors] look for a story, a justification before they trade [in 
contrast to just following influential local figures]. 
 
 I asked my interlocutors in the four sites and beyond about the historical and 
logical reasons behind this frame and the associated causal schema. The answers varied. 
Many referred to the resurgent presence of foreign institutional investors in the ISE in the new 
millennium which, they believed, had made the ISE “a globalized market” and more open to 
the vagaries of global economic and financial events. They contrasted this situation with the 
1990s when, they believed, the ISE’s agenda and indices were most of the time moved by 
local economic, political and financial actors, and events. Hande, an experienced investment 
adviser from Firm B stated the following that captures this view well (Informal discussion, 9 
April 2008): 
'Why we look at what happens abroad, US data etc., because after the 2001 financial crisis in 
Turkey, the ISE and the Turkish economy have rebounded well and foreigners have bought up 
the market. This has also coincided with the liquidity surge from the USA following the 
Dot.com crush and 9/11. All these have changed our perceptions here about the ISE.'  
 
 Related to this global liquidity factor, many also mentioned to the deteriorating 
global economic and market conditions since 2007, which underpinned the concerns in the 
retail investing and brokerage field about what the foreign institutional investors in the ISE 
would do in the face of these conditions. To predict that too, investment advisers looked 
abroad and invoked the frame frequently.  
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 Few got more specific about the assumed underlying economic factors behind 
the frame, and pointed at the Turkish economy’s export links with developed economies such 
as Germany: 
Nothing like this was followed before, but globalisation has made markets connected, and that 
is why we follow what happens abroad. I think there should be one-on-one relationship 
between our market and the markets with which we have trade relationships. Look at India, 
we don't have any significant relationship as such and we don't look at what happens in their 
financial markets. But the DAX, yes we follow closely, because Germany is our biggest trade 
partner, and their real economy is at the centre of financial markets and Europe. (Interview, 
Head Of Branches, Firm A 14 March 2008) 
 
  Some on the other hand just dismissed the objectivity of the frame and the 
associated causal schema as exemplified in the “parrot” and “soiling ourselves” quotes before. 
Despite these differences, one can argue that the significant stock ownership presence of 
foreign institutional investors in the ISE in the new millennium is a shared knowledge that 
underpins the frame's endurance and the different explanations on its origins in the ISE. As 
long as the foreigners continue to be the dominant investors in the ISE in terms of ownership 
and the Turkish retail investors continue their high frequency trading preference, the frame 
and the associated causal template are poised to endure in different semantic fields in the ISE.   
5. Discussion  
 Irrespective of the differences in usage mode and frequencies, for all my 
interlocutors in the four sites, the frame and the causal schema was, to use Tversky and 
Kahneman’s  (2002, 22-23) term, constituted a significant ‘model’ or ‘heuristic’ by which 
they made sense of the unfolding market situations both abroad and in the ISE, and also 
predicted the latter. As Kahneman and Frederick (2002, 53) put it, the general purpose of a 
heuristic is to substitute a target attribute with the heuristic attribute in one’s judgement about 
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the target attribute. The frame and the associated causal schema that I observed in my 
interlocutors’ narratives constituted representativeness heuristic from the ‘model and 
outcome’ perspective (Tversky and Kahneman, 2002, 23). With this heuristic, my 
interlocutors associated the figures they observed on their computer screens, such as index 
values, share prices, and trading volumes, with the frame and the associated causal schema. 
The observed figures from abroad and Turkey made sense only as the necessary manifestation 
of this internalized interpretive model rather than a manifestation of some other probably 
unrelated cause that could not be fathomed by or was not relevant to the model.  
Consequently, and in line with what Cetina and Preda (2007) described about cognition in 
scopic market systems, this cognitive process and its recurring narrative outcomes were not 
grounded in a mode of calculation and/or probabilistic model. Instead, they were informed by 
naturalistic or intuitive thinking particular to the situated cognitive systems found in these 
observation sites.  
 I therefore did not observe any of my interlocutors, including analysts, using or 
planning to develop any scientific or practitioner econometric model to quantify and measure 
the global and local macro and micro economic variables and effects associated with this 
frame.  Instead, the frame and the associated causal schema had been underpinned by a 
number of historical events in the ISE discussed above. They were also kept reified and 
internalized as a social fact by the investment advisers’ ongoing narrative explanations and 
predictions of daily market events and actions from abroad and Turkey. These information 
flows were ever present on the investment advisers' scopic screens. The investment advisers 
therefore made a continuous effort to follow such flows from abroad. They tried to have a 
constant cognitive tab on these “market movers” in places far away from Istanbul and Turkey 
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to make sense of the ISE’s movements. This type of data from abroad can thus be seen as an 
important ‘anchor’ (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974; Chapman and Johnson, 2002, 130) for my 
interlocutors that helped them to make sense and predict the local share and index values. 
 In fact, looking at Table 1, one can observe that the narratives were not all about 
past events. Nearly half of them predicted a future state in the market. This was also the case 
in the 276 narratives that invoked the globalized ISE frame. The narratives in general and the 
frame in particular can therefore be seen as not only an anchor but also a cognitive model that 
increases confidence among investment advisers in their knowing and predicting the states of 
the markets. Considering the marginal presence of 11 frame-invoking randomness narratives 
in the dataset, it seems that the investment advisers had little difficulty in making sense of the 
markets by using the frame. Also, as can be seen from the table, more than 80 per cent of the 
narratives happened in conversations. This type of learning by collectively narrating 
experiences in particular ways, i.e. by drawing on the frame, is similar to Gervais' and 
Odean's (2001) model on how investors can individually and collectively learn to be 
overconfident about their ability to judge the relevance and significance of information and to 
generate meaningful returns.  
 Gervais and Odean (2001) argue that such overconfident investors, who are 
assumed to trade on irrelevant information and/or sell winners and buy losers, may survive in 
markets where they have successful periods in return generation and where there are lots of 
new comers. In the case of the ISE's retail investing and brokerage field, the overconfidence 
of investment advisers could be attributed to the ubiquity of the frame across different 
investor and broker types, and to the historically institutionalized short-termism and high 
frequency trading of retail investors. 
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 Brown et al (1989, 37) point out that recurring features of an environment where 
situated cognition takes place can afford recurring sequences of action. The ubiquity on 
investment advisers’ computer screens of data from abroad and Turkey,, the institutional and 
historical underpinnings of the frame such as the ongoing strong presence of foreign 
institutional investors in the ISE, and the short-term investment preference of Turkish retail 
investors that sustain the bulk of brokerage firms’ income constituted some of the recurring 
features of the situated cognition environment for the investment advisers. These features 
afforded them a recurrent type of narrative explanations and predictions, and led to the 
featuring of the representative heuristic, anchoring, and overconfidence in their narrative 
judgements about the unfolding markets.  
 As I argue above, the frame and the associated causal schema can be seen as 
endemic to the ISE’s retail investor and brokerage field, not just to the four observation sites 
where I collected data. Although not associated with my arguments and findings, there are 
recent econometric studies on the ISE’s co-movement and return integration with developed 
and emerging country markets. For instance, Berument et al (2011) have found out that 
between 2000 and 2010, there has been a strong one-way correlation between unexpected 
shocks in various US indexes, foremost among them the DJI  (which my interlocutors called 
the DOW and carefully followed), and the movements of the ISE 30 (blue chip index) and 
other ISE indices. According to Berument et al (2011), the effects of individual market shocks 
from the USA on the ISE were not just contemporaneous. They also explained the seven-day 
period movements of various ISE indexes. Interestingly, Berument et al (2011, 89) refer to 
two US indices, the Russell 2000 and the AMEX Composite (small and medium sized 
company indices in the USA) as affecting various non-financial ISE indices’ movements the 
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most. They speculate that this might be because of American small-cap investors’ desire to 
diversify their portfolio across foreign markets that are small and middle size capitalization in 
nature such as the ISE.  
 In Berument et al (2011), there is no reference to the Turkish retail investors’ 
probable role in the generation of these observed co-movements as the biggest liquidity 
providers to the ISE. In my field notes, there is no single phrase or sentence noted down on 
the AMEX or the Russell 2000. These indexes were unknowns to my interlocutors in the 
observation sites and beyond. The discrepancy between Berument et al’s (2011) speculative 
explanation and my field research-based insight calls for more dialogue between sociologists 
and behavioural finance scholars. This is necessary for a better understanding of the 
sociological and behavioural dynamics and consequences of situated cognition in financial 
markets.  
 Nevertheless, Berument et al’s (2011) econometric findings about ISE’s 
movements in the last decade support my argument that the frame and the associated causal 
schema are endemic to the ISE retail investor and brokerage field, which has historically 
enjoyed the leading role in daily price movements in the ISE.  In a way, the frame, when 
considered with the above-discussed econometric evidence, can be seen as taking on a 
performative function similar to how MacKenzie (2006) described an economic model 
formatting a real life market rather than reporting on its existing state.  
6. Conclusion 
 In this paper, I have discussed the components of a situated cognitive system 
that underpins individual market actors’ cognition and decision-making. Foremost among 
them are the institutionalized and internalized roles, norms, and the social stock of knowledge 
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in a financial market. These imply that individual psychological factors are not the only 
reason behind the emergence and proliferation of judgement and decision heuristics and 
errors. In a given financial market, professionals and investors alike construct, maintain, 
modify, and socialize into a social stock of knowledge and the roles and norms springing from 
it. As pointed out by behavioural finance scholars, this social stock of knowledge may 
manifest itself in the form of fads and fashions or intuitive economic stories/arguments that 
spread like an epidemic and persist for some time. Other aspects of situated cognition systems 
such as representation and calculation technologies also matter for individual market actors’ 
judgement and decision-making as they provide a cognitive environment with recurring 
features. The study of behavioural origins of anomalies observed in financial markets such as 
overconfidence, optimism, overreaction, and underreaction can therefore benefit from 
understanding cognition and decision-making as happening in a situated cognitive system and 
underpinned by a social stock of knowledge. In this vein, narratives of market professionals 
and investors alike can reveal the contours of this knowledge stock, and its effects on 
judgements, decisions, and aggregate market outcomes.  
 As I have discussed it in the case of the ISE, the recent story that characterizes 
the social stock of knowledge in this emerging market has been about the ISE’s changing 
status in the global financial system. This status is believed to be reinforced by the increasing 
presence of foreign institutional investors in share ownership and, to lesser extent, in trading 
volume in the ISE. This story does not have only one plot. There are different interpretations, 
evidence, and actors featuring in my interlocutors’ arguments about the “globalized ISE” 
frame and the associated causal schema. Despite these differences in explanatory plots, and 
whether one internalizes this frame and the associated causal schema objectively or 
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strategically, this interpretive model acted as representative heuristic and anchors in my 
interlocutors’ narrative explanations and predictions of the unfolding market events in the 
ISE. They were thus influential on their Turkish retail clients’ cognition and decision-making, 
and possibly on the econometrically observed co-movements of the ISE with developed stock 
markets. Because the Turkish retail investors have historically been generating bulk of the 
liquidity in the ISE, this representative heuristic and anchor could not be ignored and thus was 
strategically taken into account by foreign and Turkish institutional investors and their 
brokers in their trading and portfolio adjustments in the ISE.  
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Appendix-List of Interviews 
Retail sales- All interviewees are from different brokerage firms. The exceptions are 
interviewees 2 and 9. 
1. General manager, brokerage firm, 26 February 2008 
2. Head of a branch, brokerage firm, 8 May 2008 
3. Head of retail sales, brokerage firm, 15 August 2008 
4. Retail sales manager, brokerage firm, 18 August 2008 
5. Retail sales assistant manager, brokerage firm, 27 August 2008 
6. Regional retail sales manager, brokerage firm, 1 September 2008 
7. Head of retail sales, brokerage firm, 4 September 2008 
8. General manager, brokerage firm, 10 September 2008 
9. Chief floor broker, brokerage firm, 12 September 2008 
10. Head of a branch, brokerage firm, 17 June 2009 
Interviewees from regulators and brokerage sector  
1. Assistant general manager, Surveillance Department, ISE, 27June 2007  
2. Expert, Statistics and Valuation Department, ISE, 29 August 2008 
3. General manager, Surveillance Department, ISE, 29 August 2008 
4. Assistant general manager, Equity Market Department, ISE, 11 September 2008 
5. General manager and Head of research, ACMIT 15 July 2009 
Notable retail investors in the ISE  
1. A retail investor and a former broker from pre-automation era, 19 July, 2007  
2. A client of Firm C and a former broker of a notable retail investor, 11 August 2008  
3. A client of Firm D and a former brokerage firm owner, 18 June 2009 
4. A client of Firm D, 24 June 2009 
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iIn the Turkish brokerage sector , there is usually a minimum asset threshold a retail investor has to commit to a brokerage firm to be able 
to get the services of headquarters -based investment advisers, a service that is more personalized and comprehensive than online and 
execution-only service via telephone dealers. This minimum amount varies from firm to firm and also depends on the frequency of trading 
on the part of the client. In the brokerage firms where I made my observations, the asset threshold figure was generally more than 50,000 
TL, which according to the ACMIT figures for 2009 puts an investor within an approximately 175,000 strong Turkish retail investor group 
who commit between 10,000 TL and 1 million TL to investing in the ISE The bulk of the brokerage firm revenues (above 70 per cent on 
average since 2003 according to  ACMIT figures) come from fees on client transactions and loans Although exact commission fee rates are 
kept confidential, my interviews with senior managers in the observation sites and beyond revealed that depending on the trading volume 
and/or assets committed, commission fees varied. For instance, in Firm A headquarters, I was told, the fee rates were one of the most 
competitive in the retail brokerage field owing to very high frequency trading clients there. In Firm B headquarters however, commission 
fees were said to be on the high side in the field owing to less frequently trading clients and comprehensive research service given to them. 
In Firm D, one of the biggest brokerage firms in Turkey, the fee rates varied depending on clients' trading frequency but the rates  in Firm D 
headquarters were competitive in the sector owing to high-frequency trading and/or high net worth clients there.  
